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Summary: On September 8, 2003, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia hosted a workshop on consumer bankruptcy and its effect on
unsecured lenders. Professor Melissa Jacoby of Temple University’s School of Law
led the workshop. A leading bankruptcy scholar, Jacoby described the current
bankruptcy system and the potential impact of Chapter 7 reforms on the rights of
unsecured creditors. This paper summarizes Jacoby’s presentation and the ensuing
discussion. It offers a brief overview of consumer bankruptcy and the rights of
unsecured creditors that lend money to individuals who ultimately file for bankruptcy.
It also discusses the proposed amendments to the bankruptcy code being debated in
Congress. Finally, the paper concludes with Jacoby’s assessment of how unsecured
lenders, such as credit card issuers, would likely be treated in the proposed system.1
Introduction
Over 1.6 million non-business bankruptcy cases were filed in federal court in the 12-
month period ending June 2003.
1 This represented a 10 percent increase over the same period in
2002
2 and a 100 percent increase over the same period in 1995.
3 The impact of bankruptcy on
credit card issuers is significant.
4 In 2002, credit card issuers charged off a record $60 billion.
5
Almost one-third of these chargeoffs (approximately $18 billion) were due to cardholder
bankruptcy.
6 A dramatic increase in bankruptcies and an attendant increase in chargeoffs due to
bankruptcies have had credit card issuers lobbying for reform for several years. 
The treatment of card issuers in the current bankruptcy system and the bankruptcy
reforms being considered by Congress were topics of a Payment Cards Center workshop held on
September 8, 2003. The Center invited bankruptcy expert Melissa Jacoby of Temple University’s
School of Law to lead the workshop. This paper, based on Jacoby’s presentation and additional
Center research, offers an overview of consumer bankruptcy laws and their effect on unsecured
creditors. The paper also considers the proposed amendments to the bankruptcy code currently
being debated in Congress. The paper concludes with Jacoby’s assessment of how unsecured
lenders, such as credit card issuers, would likely be treated under the proposed system.
Consumer Bankruptcy
The United States Supreme Court, in a 1915 opinion, explained the purpose of
bankruptcy as follows:
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2 Id.
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…to convert the assets of the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors, and
then to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit
him to start afresh…
7
Overall, the bankruptcy system allows consumers who are unable to meet their financial
obligations to “start afresh” in a manner that is fair and equitable to their creditors. Those who file
for bankruptcy can emerge with less debt and more favorable repayment terms on the debt that
they retain. Filers also benefit from a court-enforced “stay,” an order that temporarily prevents
creditors from making any efforts to collect the debts the filer has included in the bankruptcy.
8 
Consumers basically have two filing options: Chapter 7 (often referred to as a
“liquidation”) and Chapter 13 (often referred to as a “reorganization”). Regardless of which
chapter consumers choose, the end result is the same  they do not have personal liability for
many of their debt obligations at the conclusion of the process. In bankruptcy parlance, these debt
obligations are “discharged.” In Chapter 7, the discharge of debt occurs soon after the filing,
while in Chapter 13 the discharge usually does not occur until the completion of a three- to five-
year repayment plan. In theory, Jacoby explained, Chapter 7 debtors essentially “buy” a discharge
with the assets they currently hold. With certain exceptions, debtors’ assets are handed over to a
court-appointed trustee who liquidates them and divides the resulting proceeds among creditors
according to bankruptcy code provisions. Any unsecured debt that remains is uncollectible. In
Chapter 13, Jacoby explained, debtors “put their discharge on layaway” and essentially buy the
discharge with future income. The debtor proposes a three- to five-year plan during which
secured loans, priority debts, and, to the extent there is disposable income left over, some portion
of the debtor’s unsecured loans are repaid. At the end of the plan, the debtor’s remaining
                                                
7 Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
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unsecured debts are discharged. The next two sections briefly describe Chapters 7 and 13 and
highlight how unsecured creditors are treated under these two regimes.
Chapter 7
Almost 70 percent of the 1.6 million bankruptcies filed between July 1, 2002, and June
30, 2003, were filed under Chapter 7.
9 Those who file for Chapter 7 essentially trade all of their
current assets (with some exceptions) for freedom from the obligations associated with their past
debts. In this way, Chapter 7 is mostly attractive to debtors for whom the value of their debts
vastly exceeds the value of their assets.
10 These typically include debtors who do not own a home
and who have large amounts of unsecured debt.
11 According to the Department of Justice, 96
percent of the Chapter 7 bankruptcies filed in the 12-month period ending in June 2002 were “no
asset filings.”
12 This means that after allowing debtors to retain assets considered necessary for
them to remain self-sufficient (e.g., future income, clothes, and some furniture and household
items) and excluding assets fully encumbered by security interests, very few Chapter 7 filers had
any remaining valuables. Chapter 7 filers with assets above and beyond those needed for self-
sufficiency are required to relinquish them to a trustee for liquidation. The proceeds of this
liquidation are generally divided among general unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis after
satisfying secured claims, priority claims, or both.
Jacoby explained that unsecured creditors face three obstacles that limit the possibility of
recovering anything from those who file Chapter 7: generous state exemptions, unfavorable rules
applicable to the distribution of proceeds, and deficient asset verification procedures.
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First, although a court-appointed trustee has the power to sell the filer’s assets to repay
creditors, state and federal laws exclude certain assets from sale by the trustee.
13 As explained
above, the excluded or “exempt” assets are purposefully placed beyond the reach of creditors so
that the debtor can remain self-sufficient.
14 Jacoby explained that depending on the laws of their
state, debtors may opt for the state or federal exemption  generally choosing the more generous
of the two if they are in the minority of states that permit such a choice. Federal law exempts
items such as retirement plans, $2,775 of motor vehicle equity, $17,425 of home equity, and
$9,300 of household goods and furnishings.
15 State exemptions vary significantly. For example,
Texas offers very generous exemptions, allowing debtors to keep all of their home equity
16 and
$60,000 of personal property.
17 Pennsylvania, a far less generous state, does not exempt any
home equity but allows debtors to exempt only some specific personal items (e.g., bible, sewing
machine, and wearing apparel).
18 The extent to which a debtor may exempt assets
disproportionately affects unsecured creditors. Bankruptcy generally does not remove a creditor’s
security interest in an asset. After the court-enforced stay is over, a secured creditor can always
seize its asset if the debtor does not make the required payments. Unsecured creditors, however,
are left with little or no recourse after the bankruptcy discharge unless the debtor, court, and
creditor agree otherwise. They are entitled only to a pro rata share of the proceeds that remain
after the non-exempt assets are sold. Ultimately, the more generous the exemptions, the less
available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
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Second, recovery prospects of unsecured lenders are negatively affected by repayment
prioritizations and creditor preferences set forth in the bankruptcy code. Unsecured creditors are
last among those who need to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of non-exempt assets.
Secured lenders, bankruptcy trustees, and attorneys have priority for the full amount of their
claims over unsecured lenders. The bankruptcy code also subordinates unsecured debt, such as
credit card debt, to unsecured debt held by “priority creditors.” Debt owed to priority creditors is
considered non-dischargeable and includes student loans, court fees, criminal fines, child support,
and most federal, state, and local taxes.
19
Finally, Jacoby noted that unsecured creditor recoveries can also be negatively impacted
by potentially sloppy asset verification procedures. It is the responsibility of the bankruptcy
trustee to verify the asset information the debtor provides in the filing. Ideally, trustees would
confirm the self-reported information by examining bank statements, home appraisals, and prior
income tax filings. In practice, however, trustees generally have spent little verifying information.
Jacoby explained that trustees, who are paid just $75 per case by the court, are simply not
compensated in a way that would encourage such thoroughness. Undetected inaccuracies in a
debtor’s filing may shelter assets that should otherwise be liquidated and distributed to unsecured
creditors. In an effort to combat abuses of the bankruptcy system, the U.S. Trustee Program
launched a civil enforcement initiative in October 2001. This initiatives aims to crack down on
those that make false representations in their bankruptcy filings.
20
Given the systematic challenges that unsecured creditors face, it is not surprising that, of
the $1.5 billion disbursed to Chapter 7 creditors in fiscal year 2001, unsecured creditors received
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about $350 million, or one-quarter, of this payout. 
21 Although Chapter 7 bankruptcies often result
in a complete loss for card issuers, firms that specialize in finding errors and fraud in bankruptcy
petitions will sometimes purchase Chapter 7 chargeoffs for $0.01 per $100 of debt.
 22 In contrast,
non-bankruptcy credit card chargeoffs can fetch as much as $5 per $100 of debt.
23
Generally, the best an unsecured creditor can hope for in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Jacoby
explained, is debt reaffirmation. Before his or her debts are formally discharged, a debtor can ask
the court to allow one or more debts to be reaffirmed or excluded from the discharge. By
“reaffirming” his or her responsibility for a particular debt (e.g., a car loan), the debtor is able to
keep possession of the asset that underlies it (e.g., a car). Jacoby indicated that 20 percent to 25
percent of Chapter 7 filers reaffirm at least one debt. The majority of reaffirmed debt, she
explained, is unsecured or minimally secured. Given the importance of having a credit card to be
able to make hotel reservations or put down temporary security deposits on goods, it may be in a
filer’s interest to reaffirm at least one of his or her credit card debts.
Chapter 13
Approximately 30 percent of the consumer bankruptcies filed in the 12-month period
ending in June 2003 were filed under Chapter 13. Unlike Chapter 7 debtors, who are required to
hand over all of their non-exempt unencumbered assets (including any non-exempted home
equity), Chapter 13 debtors can keep all of their property and possessions. Instead of paying
creditors with proceeds from a sale of their assets, Chapter 13 debtors pledge to pay creditors for
a period of three to five years with any future income above that necessary to cover living
expenses (i.e., any disposable income). To accomplish this, the debtor and bankruptcy court work
out a monthly payment plan that requires the debtor to send monthly payments to a bankruptcy
trustee for creditor distribution. At the end of the three- to five-year plan, any unsecured debt that
remains is discharged.
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Chapter 13 is especially attractive to debtors facing foreclosure or who have non-exempt
home equity (i.e., more equity than allowed by state or federal law) because of special provisions
that help stave off foreclosure.
 24 Although the bankruptcy code does not allow a debtor to change
any of the terms of his or her mortgage (e.g., interest rate, length of loan, fee structure), it does
allow the debtor to “cure” a default. In exchange for satisfying past due mortgage payments,
Chapter 13 enables a debtor to have his or her mortgage “cured” or reinstated to its original
terms.
25 Once the Chapter 13 debtor cures his or her mortgage, it is as if the default never
occurred. These home protections, as well as the ability to make debtor-friendly modifications to
car loans, make Chapter 13 an attractive option for those who have property they want to keep.
Given the future income expectations and homeownership desires of those who are
attracted to Chapter 13, it is not surprising that this chapter returns more money to secured and
unsecured creditors.
26  Jacoby indicated, however, that Chapter 13’s provisions place general
unsecured creditors at a distinct disadvantage.
As in Chapter 7, unsecured creditors have the lowest priority. Secured lenders, lawyers,
and priority creditors (e.g., those owed child support, taxes, alimony), take priority over
unsecured creditors in two ways. First, their claims are the first to be subtracted from the debtor’s
total disposable income for the three- to five-year period. What disposable income that remains is
divided among unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis. Second, most debtor’s plans defer
payment of unsecured creditors until later in the plan period. The debtor prefers to direct the early
portion of payments to those creditors that must be paid in full (i.e., secured creditors). An
unsecured creditor may have to wait years before receiving any money, reducing the net present
value of their repayment.
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As in Chapter 7, trustees take priority over unsecured lenders. In Chapter 13, however, a
trustee’s duties are more complex. Among other things, a Chapter 13 trustee must oversee the
debtor’s three- to five-year repayment plan. For their work, Jacoby explained, trustees sometimes
receive as much as 10 percent of the disbursements, although the percentage varies by bankruptcy
court district. In fiscal year 2001, trustees received approximately $380 million, almost half as
much as was returned to unsecured creditors ($800 million).
27
Since unsecured creditors are the last to be repaid, they are incommensurately
disadvantaged when a debtor has low non-disposable income. The code allows debtors to retain
income for “necessary expenses.” Jacoby explained, however, that the meaning of “necessary”
can vary greatly. Trustees, creditors, and debtors could find themselves entangled in litigation
over whether private-school tuition payments, children’s braces, airfare for trips to see relatives,
and other such expenditures are “necessary” expenses. The extent to which debtors are able to
increase the level of these expenses reduces the amount available to support repayment of
unsecured creditors. 
One of the greatest risks for unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 involves plan completion.
Despite the effort (and often the $1,000 to $1,500 in fees for an attorney)
28 that goes into filing a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, Jacoby asserted that only one-third of filers actually complete their
plans.
29  This low completion rate disproportionately impacts unsecured lenders because, as
explained above, they are not usually scheduled to receive any distributions until the latter years
of the program. Debtors who do not complete their plans, however, generally do not receive a
discharge, clearing the way for unsecured creditors to resume collection efforts if they so choose.
                                                                                                                                                
$357 million in Chapter 7 disbursements. Secured creditors received $2.1 billion in Chapter 13
disbursements and $451 million in Chapter 7 disbursements. Flynn, supra note 11.
27 Id.
28 Amy Borrus, Personal Bankruptcy: Beware the Next Chapter Reforms Will Make It Harder to File
Successfully, BUS. WK., Sept. 30, 2002, at 112.
29 She indicated that this proportion has remained stable over time, although it varies by state.9
Overall, Chapter 13 disbursements accounted for 70 percent of the money returned to
unsecured creditors through the bankruptcy system.
30 This, however, does not take into account
sums paid to creditors outside and after bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Reform Legislation
After describing the current provisions of Chapters 7 and 13, Jacoby discussed the reform
legislation passed by the House of Representatives last spring.
31 According to the Judiciary
Committee’s report, the purpose of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2003 is “to improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and
integrity in the bankruptcy system and by ensuring that the system is fair for both debtors and
creditors.”
32 The legislation attempts to accomplish this through a series of substantial
modifications to the ways consumers and businesses can enter into and are treated by the
bankruptcy system.
33 Jacoby focused her comments on those portions of the 500-page piece of
legislation that would affect unsecured creditors, including the means test, the disposable income
calculation, and auto lender protections.
Jacoby began with an overview of one of the bill’s most controversial provisions: a
screen designed to keep certain debtors out of Chapter 7. The screen, she explained, is
implemented by a “means test.”
34  The means test bars debtors from Chapter 7 if they meet either
of the following criteria: They have the disposable income necessary to pay unsecured creditors
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$10,000 or more in a Chapter 13 plan or they have sufficient disposable income to pay back at
least a quarter of their debt under a Chapter 13 plan (if that quarter is at least $6,000).
By limiting those who can seek protection under Chapter 7 and likely forcing a higher
percentage of filers into Chapter 13, unsecured creditors hope to increase their chances of getting
repaid. In Jacoby’s opinion, however, this means test does not accurately evaluate repayment
ability and other provisions of the new legislation may offset many of the advantages gained by
Chapter 7 screening.
The means test, Jacoby explained, has a number of “safe harbors” that preclude Chapter 7
filers from being challenged under the means test. One of these safe harbors is for debtors whose
monthly income is equal to or less than the median household income of their state.
35 Henry E.
Hildebrand III, chairman of the Legal and Legislative Rules Committee of the National
Association of Chapter 13 Trustees, estimates that 84 percent of existing filers have household
incomes below their state’s median.
 36 This suggests that, on the basis of income alone, the screen
would actually affect very few debtors. Jacoby explained that the means test does not apply to
filers whose debts are not primarily consumer debts, allowing those with business- or investment-
related debts to bypass the screen. High-income debtors can also shield themselves from being
means tested out of Chapter 7 by taking on more secured debt. Professor Michael Staten of the
Georgetown Credit Research Center estimates that, given these exceptions, fewer than 5 percent
of bankruptcy filers will be funneled from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 by the screen.
37
Jacoby suggested that modifications to the disposable income calculations, which also
would be used for Chapter 13 repayment plans, may also negatively impact unsecured creditors.
Under the proposed legislation, disposable income will be calculated by subtracting the living
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expenses, based on the Internal Revenue Service’s National Standards for Allowable Living
Expenses, from the debtor’s income. Used by the IRS to calculate living expenses for those who
evade their taxes, the standards would allow debtors with higher monthly incomes to spend more
on clothing, food, and personal services than debtors with lower incomes. For example, under the
current standards, a family of four with a household income of $28,000 a year would be allowed
$900 in monthly living expenses, while the same family earning $70,000 a year in income would
be allowed $1,500 per month.
38 Although Jacoby did not speculate how this change would impact
unsecured creditors, the extent to which the new standards could reduce disposable income would
directly affect the monies available for creditor distribution.
Jacoby also asserts that the proposed legislation provides automobile lenders with greater
protections at the expense of unsecured creditors. Under current Chapter 13 provisions, if a
borrower has an $8,000 loan on a car that has a market value of $6,000, the automobile lender’s
claim is split (or “bifurcated”). As a result, the lender has a “secured” claim of $6,000 and an
“unsecured” claim of $2,000. The $6,000 obligation must be paid in full, with interest. In the
plan, this debt would likely be among the first to be paid. The automobile lender’s $2,000 portion
is unsecured, and as such, the lender receives only a pro-rata share of any remaining disposable
income (just as any other unsecured creditor would). The new legislation does not permit
bifurcation in most cases.
39 Instead, the automobile lender in the example above would have a
fully secured $8,000 claim. This modification negatively affects unsecured lenders by increasing
the size of the claims that have repayment priority.
Jacoby also discussed other changes that could affect unsecured creditors. Through Truth
in Lending Act amendments, the new legislation requires enhanced unsecured loan disclosures.
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These include minimum payment, late payment, and “teaser rate” warnings.
40 The bill requires
credit counseling as a condition of eligibility and financial education as a condition of discharge.
Proponents hope such counseling will inform people about the alternatives to and consequences
of bankruptcy.
41 The legislation also requires that more plans last five years instead of three and
make non-dischargeable debts for luxury goods acquired just prior to filing.
Overall, Jacoby does not believe that unsecured creditors will fare much better once
inside the proposed system. In her view, the Chapter 7 screening mechanism will have little
impact on changing the mix of consumer filings. Even if more people get funneled into Chapter
13, she believes that proposed modifications to that chapter could leave unsecured creditors worse
off. The most obvious benefit for unsecured creditors, Jacoby asserted, is that some debtors could
be delayed or deterred by the many new filing requirements and changes. This could give card
issuers and other unsecured creditors more time to collect on their debts. In addition, less debt
may be discharged in the bankruptcy process for those who file.
Conclusion
Although bankruptcy reform efforts have been under way for almost a decade, Jacoby
remained doubtful that the proposed legislation will make positive improvements to the system or
increase creditor returns in bankruptcy. In her opinion, the proposed system employs too many
resources, has unclear goals, and may not provide any real benefits to unsecured creditors. Credit
card issuers’ losses, however, are mounting. Under the current system, it is expected that
bankruptcies will cumulatively account for more than $60 billion in charged-off credit card loans
over the next three years.
42 Card industry observers believe that even if just 10 percent of Chapter
7 filers can be funneled into Chapter 13, industry savings could be in the hundreds of millions of
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dollars.
43 Although this may be possible in theory, Jacoby and others doubt that the savings will
be as significant because of the details of this legislation and the financial situations of the
households that file.
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